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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 6375 
Two statements under the heading ''Statement of 
Facts'' on page 4 of respondent's brief are erroneous 
conclusions, and should be corrected. 
One is: ''This intersection is a well-lighted inter-
section." Since much of the argument of that brief is 
premised upon this conclusion, we think it important to 
point out that all the evidence in the case indicates that 
this is not a well-lighted intersection. On the contrary, 
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it shows that the intersection was dark. There was only 
one arc light and that was on the southwest corner-
the far corner from both the driver of the truck and 
the rider of the bicycle. (Tr. 83). Lights were on both 
service stations on the northeast and southeast corners 
but these stations were lit to illuminate themselves and 
not the road. A careful scrutiny of Exhibit '' D ''-a 
photograph obviously taken in the day time- shows the 
lighting system used on the two stations. The search 
lights shown there are shielded so that the light is 
thrown away fron1 the road and on the service stations. 
The intersection was definitely not well-lighted. 
The other conclusion is an unfortunate phrasing of 
the testimony of the location of the defendant's truck 
after the accident. Respondent said: ''Defendant's truck 
proceeded east on Ninth South Street 157 feet from the 
point of impact before it stopped. ( Tr. 100)." There 
was no evidence of what the truck did after the accident, 
either by tracks or skid marks (Tr. 107) or by eye 
witness. Adamson may have stopped it and then pulled 
it over to the side of the road out of the way. We know 
only that it was on the side of Ninth South Street 157 
feet from the probable point of collision some indefinite 
time after the accident (Tr. 77, 100). 
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ARGUMENT 
L There is no Evidence to Support the Verdict. 
1. The Defendant's Speed (Par. (a) of Resp~on­
dent's Brief). 
Respondent objects to the fact that counsel for the 
- appellant limited his discussion entirely to the miles per 
hour which the defendant was going at the intersection 
·~ at Ninth South Street and Second West. We submit 
.... 
that regardless of the circumstances, if the unlawful act 
to be proved was the defendant's speed, that speed must 
be shown. No speed at the intersection was shown. So 
to deduce this speed respondent's brief sets forth the 
- following points : 
(a) Moulton's testimony can be interpreted, saye 
the brief, to find that the defendant maintained his 
speed of between 35 and 40 miles per hour until he 
made his turn. We have already pointed out that 
Moulton changed his testimony and did not indicate at 
any time where it was that Adamson was driving at that 
speed. In a criminal case we must not deal in specula-
tion, especially as there is direct evidence contradicting 
this inference. The positive evidence in the case, con-
tradicting respondent's inference, is that the defendant 
drove slowly into the intersection. (Tr. 115). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
(b) The jury, says the respondent, could have 
taken into consideration the fact that the defendant's 
truck was driven a distance of 157 feet from the point 
of i1npact before he brought it to a stop. 
There is no evidence that the defendant drove 157 
feet before he brought his truck to a stop. There is no 
evidence of what he did after the impact except walk 
toward the place of the accident after he had parked 
the truck ( Tr. 77). We know only that when the officer~ 
arrived on the scene some tilne after the accident, 
Adamson's truck \Vas on the side of the road 157 feet 
from the probable point of impact. Adamson may have 
stopped in the 1niddle of the road immediately after 
the impact and then driven his truck off the side of the 
road. Or he may have chosen to drive until he got off 
the road. We must remember he was driving a long 
truck with three sets of wheels (Exhibit "A"), and 
that some distance is required to get a long truck off 
the road to clear it for passing traffic. By no right 
can we infer without any evidence that Adamson could 
not bring his truck to a stop before the place where he 
parked it. 
(c) The jury, said the respondent, could also have 
considered the force with which Kanon was struck, as 
evidenced by the various injuries which he received. As 
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a matter of fact the bodily injuries of Kanon have no 
bearing upon the speed of the truck. It is co1nmon 
knowledge that a slight impact by a heavy body against 
a light one can seriously injure the light one regardless 
of the speed of the heavier body. 
(d) In a fourth attempt to show speed the respon-
dent claims that the jury could take into consideration 
the traffic on the highway and the hazard at the inter-
section and any other conditions therein existing in 
determining whether or not the defendant was driving 
at a speed which was greater than was reasonable and 
prudent. This statement is true as far as it goes but 
it involves two factors: first, the traffic, and second, 
the speed. There is evidence of the traffic, but this is 
not enough. For the jury to determine whether or not 
the speed was greater than was reasonable and prudent 
there must be evidence of this speed. There is none. 
Respondent argues that since the defendant did not see 
the Kanon boy, and since there is no evidence that the 
defendant turned in any manner to avoid the collision, 
he therefore was speeding. Obviously this does not 
follow. It is a dangerous assumption, made even more 
vicious by the added assumption that the intersection 
was well-lighted. We have pointed out that the evidence 
was that the intersection was dark (Tr. 87). Another 
dangerous inference expressed by the respondent is the 
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defendant's "inability to bring the truck to a stop within 
less than 157 feet.'' There is not a fragment of 
evidence of any inability to bring the truck to a stop 
within any distance, nor any evidence that the truck 
was not brought to a stop before Adamson drove it to 
the side of the road where the officers measured its 
location. The \Vhole argument is based upon the "if" 
clauses on page 10: ''If he \vas going at a speed ... 
If he \Vas not looking . . . '' Anglo-American justiee 
does not permit us to deprive a man of his liberty 
by adding up several hypotheses to make a fact. The 
whole argument of respondent is that defendant was 
driving at a rate of speed that was not reasonable and 
prudent because he had an accident; because he had an 
accident he was driving at an excessive speed; therefore, 
because he was driving at an excessive speed he had an 
accident. 
'' Explanations by reasoning back from re-
sults with no place to land are not helpful. They 
lead to speculations only'' - Mr. Chief Justice 
Moffat, in State v. Chealey, ______ Utah ______ , 116 
P. (2d) 377. 
The case of Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N. E. 
689, is analogous in its facts to the case at bar in this:· 
That in both cases the driver of the car was faced with 
an unexpected presence of a child in the front of the 
car. Respondent argues that Adamson should have 
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anticipated the bicyclist's presence because he was at 
... the intersection. This would ordinarily be true, and 
might be true in this case if it were not for the fact 
that Kanon 'vas violating the law in the two particulars 
mentioned in the appellant's main brief, that is, he was 
riding his bicycle in the dark without a lamp and he 
was out in the inside lane of traffic instead of near 
the curb where the ordinance and prudent driving re-
quired him to be. Regardless of how careful Adamson 
might have been under this state of facts the same 
accident could have happened. 
2. Proper Lookout (Far. (a) of Resp·ondent's 
brief). 
By a summation of inferences respondent argues 
that because the Kanon boy was hit, Adamson failed 
to keep a lookout. We submit that the accidental strik-
ing in the dark of a boy on a bicycle without lights 
in the middle of the street where he is not supposed 
to be does not denote failure to keep a lookout, espec-
ially when we take into consideration the added con-
fusion of lights in the service station and the presence 
of the car which preceded the bicycle through the inter-
section. 
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3. Alleged Failur.e to Yield (Par. (b) of Respon-
dent's Brief). 
Before there can be violation of law for failure to 
yield. the right of way there must be such a right. Re-
spondent says that Sylvester Kanon had this right. 
We should bear in mind the discussion and authorities 
starting on page 24 of appellant's main brief and in 
the latter part of this brief on this point: Sylvester 
Kanon when he rode his bicycle into the intersection 
unlawfully, lost the right of way, which he other\\'ise 
would have had by virtue of the statute. 
In Logan v. Schjeldahl, 66 N. D. 152, 262 N. W. 463, 
the court said : 
"When a driver operates his vehicle in an 
unlawful manner, as for instance by driving at 
an excessive speed, he loses the right of prece-
dence which would be his under the statute had 
he been complying with the law, or as stated in 
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Permanent Edition, Sec. 1009, 'He loses 
his statutory preferential status.' '' 
Other authorities on this point are quoted under Part 
II of this brief. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
4. There is no E·vidence That the Defendant 
Violated the Reckless Driving Statute. (P·ars. 
(c) and (d) of Resp.ondent's Brief). 
There is no new evidence mentioned in this section 
of respondent's brief and it becomes a sumn1ary of the 
other allegations which were not proved: Alleged speed 
which was not reasonable and prudent, alleged failure 
to keep a lookout, and alleged failure to yield a right 
of way. There being no evidence to support any one of 
these three claims, the charge of violating the reckless 
driving statute which depends upon them must, of course, 
fail also. We should note, however, that the brief makes 
statements in this section which are not borne out by 
the evidence. There is no evidence, for example, that 
the defendant drove between 30 and 35 miles per hour 
until he arrived at the intersection, and of course no 
evidence that defendant "just sailed" through the in-
tersection. Such assertions are misleading conclusions. 
Again respondent says the intersection was "well-light-
ed". Constant repetition of those words does not make 
them a fact. 
5. Authorities Cited by Respondent (Par. (e) ). 
Though respondent admits that decisions relating 
to the sufficiency of evidence in involuntary man-
slaughter cases are not very helpful, he cites several 
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of them. '"' e should, therefore, analyze their facts and 
contrast thern with the lack of evidence of recklessness 
in the case at bar. 
In People v. Smaszcz, 344 Ill. 494, 176 N. E. 768, 
the court found that the evidence indicated that the 
defendant was going at an excessive rate of speed at 
the time of the collision. What was this evidence~ A 
witness saw the defendant's car jerking along after 
the accident, which showed, the court said, that the 
brakes had been applied and were checking the Inoinen-
tum of the car, which nevertheless ran 45 feet before 
it stopped. The force of the collision between the auto-
mobile and human flesh was so great that it sounded 
like two automobiles coming together. The street inter-
section was well-lighted. The automobile showed the 
force of the collision. The right headlight was dented, 
its glass broken, the reflector dropped out, the Inetal 
rod between the headlights was broken, and the left 
fender was badly damaged. 
''The broken bar and dented metal showed 
the force was extreme, particularly when it is 
considered that the collision was not of n1etal 
but of metal with human flesh, and that the bodies 
of the three women were thrown or dragged .J.;) 
feet from where they were struck ... 
"The flight of the plaintiff in error from 
the scene of the collision without any effort to 
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ascertain the extent of the injuries caused by 
his act or to help the injured persons Inay a.lso 
be taken into consideration as evidence of guilt.'' 
And in State v. Bedinger, 126 N. J. L. 288, 19 Atl. 
(2d) 322, a 'vitness in a rear upstairs room of the build-
ing away from the intersection heard the crash. The 
court said she was ''at a considerable distance a'vay 
under conditions none too favorable.'' This impact of 
an automobile with human flesh smashed the headlights 
and completely broke the grille work of the car, though 
the grille work was such that an expert testified it would 
not break unless under a severe impact. In this case, 
also, the defendant ran away from the scene, and the 
court said that his statement that the happening in 
question never occurred so far as he knew, could be 
taken in connection with the other evidence. Compare 
the damage done to the automobiles in this case and in 
People v. Smaszcz, supra, with the slight damage done 
to the defendant's truck in the case at bar. Officer 
Anderson testified : 
''There was, about in the center of the bump-
er there was a long scratch mark, possibly in-
flicted by coming in contact with metal. The grill 
was bent, and I found a cap and a top of a fruit 
jar bottle, the lid of a fruit jar bottle was laying 
on the fender, and there was milk spilt all over 
the windshield and also the hood and left fender.'' 
(Tr. 108). 
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No one examining the appearance of the truck in 
Exhibit "A" and that of the bicycle in Exhibit "C" 
can claim very ardently that the truck could have been 
going very fast and yet cause so little damage to the 
vehicles. 
In its discussion of State v. Elliot, 8 Atl. ( 2d) 873, 
respondent's brief assumes again that the defendant 
tried to stop his truck as soon as he could. This assump-
tion, of course, is unfounded against the evidence that 
he drove it over to the side of the road. St,ate v. Elliot 
is the decision of a lower court of Oyer and Terminer. 
Respondent's brief cites People v. Przybyl, 365 Ill. 
515, 6 N. E. (2d) 848, as authority for the proposition 
that failure of the driver to have his car under such 
control that he could avoid a; collision was an utter 
disregard of the safety of others. But compare the 
facts of that case. The defendant in that case traveling 
east in a taxicab swung to the north rail of the \Vest 
bound street car track, passed an automobile at about 
45 miles per hour in a district in which the speed limit 
was 35, struck the deceased and threw him directly 
east 40 or 50 feet, skidded about 75 feet to the south 
curbing and struck a post, shearing it off. The defen-
dant said he saw the deceased when the deceased was 
about 15 or 20 feet in front of him. The court said: 
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"Not every violation of the Motor Vehicle 
Law amounts to criminal negligence, for the 
reason that not all such negligence is reckless 
or wanton and of such a character as sho,vs an 
utter disregard for the safety of others ; but, 
'vhere excessive speed in passing other cars is 
combined with disregard for persons or things 
approaching or crossing, whom the passing driver 
cannot see, such is evidence of criminal negli-
gence.'' 
In the case at bar there is a complete absence of 
such excessive speed and of any disregard of persons. 
The defendant ran against a boy who unlawfully sud-
denly appeared before him in the dark. 
The facts of C.ornett v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 
322, 138 S. W. (2d) 492, are not at all comparable with 
those of the case at bar. In this case the defendant had 
been warned in advance of the children playing with a 
ball on the edge of a highway. In ·.the case at bar the 
defendant was suddenly confronted with an emergency 
not of his own making. 
The authorities cited on page 20 of respondent's 
brief are not applicable to the instant case because in the 
case at bar there is no evidence of speed. Further dis-
cussion of them would be pointless. 
In State v. Biewem, 169 Iowa 256, 151 N. W. 102, 
the court said that the death of the child might well 
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have been found in consequence of the recklessness of 
the driver. But in that case the child was in the road 
in plain view in broad daylight. The court said: 
'' Counsel suggest that, as the child was 
found "\vest of the center of the road, the driver's 
attention may have been distracted by the dog 
on the east side, and the child, in following the 
dog, may have run out in front of the car. A 
sufficient response to this is the mother's testi-
mony that the child was in the road in plain 
vie"\v. ~Ioreover, the driver must have been a"\vare 
of striking the child, and moving on without 
stopping or tendering assistance was a c1rcun1-
stance indicative of guilt on his part.'' 
People v. lllcKeon, 236 N. Y. S. 591, 134 Misc. Rep. 
697, the last case on sufficiency of evidence in Respon-
dent's brief, is a case from the Court of Special Ses-
sions of the City of New York, and, of course, is not 
an authority. 
II. The Court Erred in Directing the Jury. 
1. Instructions On the Right Of Way. (Par. (a) 
-of Respondent's Brief). 
The court included failing to yield the right of way 
in its fifth instruction which purported to set forth the 
law an infraction of any part of which would constitute 
grounds for conviction. Exception was properly taken 
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to this, and we submit that by including the fifth sub-
section of this instruction, the court committed reversible 
error. 
Sylvester Kanon did not have the right of 'va-y for 
two reasons: (a) because his violation of la'v in failing 
to have a light on his bicycle, and in failing to keep 
on the right side of tha road cancelled his statutory 
preferential status; and (b) because there was no evi-
dence to show his relative position to come under the 
right of way statute. 
In appellant's main brief it was pointed out that 
one who is himself violating the law can not claim the 
right of way which he otherwise would have had. This 
doctrine is sometimes set forth in statutes (interpreted 
in Johnson v. Selfe, 190 Minn. 269, 251 N. E. 525 and 
Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N. E. 2). 
We submit that it is immaterial whether the statute so 
contains it or not. The necessary implication is there 
that the one claiming the right of way must himself be 
driving legally. The cases so hold. 
In Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150, 257 P. 1079, Boyd 
made a left turn at an intersection and the defendant 
coming straight through the intersection from the right 
collided with him. The defendant answered that he had 
the right of way and that Boyd's failure to yield con-
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stituted contributory negligence. The court said that 
ordinarily he who turns must yield; but in this case 
defendant was violating the speed limit and was driving 
while intoxicated. Boyd was handicapped by the night, 
the lights, the locations of the cars, and falling snow. 
'' \\r e are now asked to fix responsibility in 
every case of automobile crossing collision in 
favor of the car having the right of \vay under the 
strict provisions of statute, ordinance, or rule of 
the road, notwithstanding drunkenness, gross 
negligence and excessive speed, and not,vithstand-
ing every reasonable precaution exercised by the 
other under circun1stances \vhich the first driver 
knew, or should have known, would in all prob-
ability prove ineffectual; to outlaw every left-
hand driver and give carte blanche to every right-
handed driver to run him down. The mere state-
ment of the proposition is its O\Vn refutation. \Ve 
know of no court that has ever countenanced it, 
and \Ve expressly repudiate it.'' 
In Andrus v. Hall, 93 Colo. 526, 27 P. (2d) 495, 
quoted in appellant's main brief, the defendant ap-
proached the intersection from the plaintiff's right and 
ordinarily would have had the right of way. However, 
he entered it at a speed in excess of the speed limit. 
The court held that a driver cannot be required to yield 
the right of way when his inability to know and act is 
chargeable to the lawless conduct of him who claims it. 
Respondent claims that if this court rules that 
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Kanon, through his violation of law, thereby lost his 
right of way, then it would have to hold that Adamson 
could run hin1 down at ""ill or that Adamson could take 
the right of 'vay from Kanon. This does not follow at 
all. Taking a preferential right from Kanon 'vould not 
give it to Adamson; it would leave both parties under 
their common law duty to exercise care. 
In Logan v. Schjeldahl, supra, the court phrased 
this as follows: 
''This does not mean, however, that the 
driver who thus loses his right of 'vay becomes 
a trespasser on the highway, neither does it mean 
that the right of way so lost is conferred upon 
the driver of another car." 
Of course Adamson could not run Kanon down if 
he saw him, but neither could the court tell the jury that 
Kanon had the right of '\vay and that because Adan1son 
failed to yield this right of way he could be found guilty 
of violating the law and therefore criminally negligent. 
The district attorney argued the right of way before 
the jury. We have no way of knowing that this part 
of the instruction was not the basis of the verdict. The 
giving of the instruction on the right of way constituted 
a reversible error. Let us remember that Kanon 's 
violation of law was in two serious particulars, either 
one of which may have been the proximate cause of 
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the accident: his riding without a light on his bicycle 
in the dark made his presence unknown; his riding on 
the inside lane of traffic placed him where he could not 
have been expected. Respondent contends that since 
there is no curb in the intersection, Kanon "\Vas not 
required to turn his vehicle to the northeast to follow 
the pedestrian lane. Such an interpretation of the 
ordinance would permit Kanon to ride straight out fro1n 
the curb line south of Ninth South Street and after he 
had crossed the intersection suddenly find himself with 
a duty of making a right angle turn in the face of north-
bound traffic in the righthand lane in order to approach 
the curb where the ordinance required him to be. The 
ordinance provides that bicycles shall drive as closely 
as practicable to the righthand edge or curb. Obviously 
it contemplates the turn by the bicycle at Ninth South 
Street toward the east so as to continue its course to 
approach the righthand edge and curb on the north-
east corner. 
Respondent claims that the balance of the right of 
way statute was properly left off because there was no 
evidence that the defendant gave a signal. We submit 
that this requirement would shift the burden of proof, 
particularly as the requirement of signaling for a left 
turn would not be pertinent to Kanon, the driver of the 
vehicle from the opposite direction. 
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2. Refusal to Instruct ,on the Q,onduct of the De-
ceased as the Proximat-e Cause of the Accident. 
(Par. (b) of Respondent's Brief). 
In its discussion of appellant's argument that the 
jury were deprived of proper instruction on the de-
ceased's conduct being the proximate cause of the acci-
dent, respondent's brief cites a number of cases which 
hold that contributory negligence is not a defense in a 
manslaughter action. We take no issue with that point. 
The jury 'vere not entitled to an instruction that the 
contributory negligence of the deceased would bar con-
viction of the defendant. They were entitled, however, 
to the requested instructions on the conduct of the de-
ceased as the proximate cause of the accident. If Kanon 's 
illegally riding without a light in the darlmess vvas the 
cause of Adamson's failure to see him, it, and not any 
negligence of Adamson, vvas the cause of the accident, 
and the jury were entitled to pass on that point. If 
Kanon's illegally being in the middle of the road 'vas 
the cause of the accident or combined with not having 
a headlight as the cause of the accident, the jury were 
entitled to determine that point. And the court's refusal 
to instruct them on Kanon 's specific conduct as the 
proximate cause of the accident was prejudicial to the 
defendant's rights to a fair trial. 
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In respondent's discussion of the requested Instruc-
tion No. 15 on page 27 it does not state the grounds 
of the objection to the sentence: "You are instructed 
that a driver may presume that others in the road will 
conduct themselves in a lawful manner,'' except to state 
that it is improper, citing State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 
671, 7 4 Atl. 927. This case does not rule on the question 
presented; the instruction there refused stated that the 
State must prove that the deceased's own negligence 
was not the proximate cause of the injury. 
Respondent also cites Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 
Ohio St. 268, 20 N. E. (2d) 522. In this case, it is true, 
the refusal of a requested instruction similar to the first 
sentence of requested Instruction No. 15 was held proper. 
That instruction was: 
''You are instructed that every person in the 
lawful use of the highways in this state has the 
right to assume that every other person using the 
said highways will do so in a lawful manner.'' 
The only reason given for such a holding was that 
it was incomplete in that it did not contain the words: 
''In the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary'', 
or similar language. If there was evidence in that case 
that the defendant had notice of the plaintiff's unla,vful 
act, the objection would be valid, otherwise, the decision 
is against the general rule. The only authority cited 
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~ by the Ohio court on that point was the eighth paragraph 
..... 
~. of the syllabus of Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 
~ 196 N. E. 27 4, a case 'vhich did not involve the question. 
It The text of the case stated the law and approved the 
inclusion of notice in the instruction, but did not pass 
on its exclusion: 
''No fault may be ascribed to failure to 
anticipate negligence of another. On the contrary, 
one may rightfully assume the observance of the 
law and the exercise of ordinary care by others 
until the contrary is made to appear. Action in 
accordance with such presumptions, in the absence 
of notice or knowledge to the contrary, is not 
negligence. Norris, Ex 'x v. Jones, Rec.'r. 110 
Ohio St. 598, 144 N. E. 274. Hence there was 
no error in the requested instructions e1nbodying 
that principle.'' 
In Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 P. 51, the 
court points out that where the evidence shows actual 
notice of the other party's violation of law, the right 
to presume that the other is observing it ceases to exist. 
The instruction there was as follows: 
'' 'You are instructed that persons upon the 
public highway, as were the plaintiffs at the time 
of the collision, had the right to presume that the 
defendant, in the operation of the said auto-
mobile, would comply with the statute pertaining 
thereto. • • *' " 
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The court said: 
'' While this instruction states the law cor-
rectly as a general proposition, it was incorrect as 
applied to the facts of this case as testified to by 
the respondents. It will be remembered that they 
testified that when they were making the turn 
at the intersection of the road they saw the appel-
lant's car coming at the rate of 45 or 50 miles 
an hour. Under these circumstances it would be 
incorrect to instruct that the respondents had a 
right to assume that the appellant was obeying 
the law." (Italics ours) 
In Harris v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 161 P. 1155, L. R. 
A. 1917 C, 477, the court said: 
'' 'The general rule is that every person has 
a right to presume that every other person 'vill 
perform his duty and obey the law; and in the 
absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise, 
it is not negligence to assume that he is not 
exposed to danger which can come to him only 
from violation of law or duty by such other per-
son.' 29 Cyc. 516; l\{eflin v. Spazier, 23 Cal. App. 
242, 137 Pac. 1078. Such person must of course, 
himself use reasonable care to observe the con-
duct of the other person so far as such conduct 
may affect his o''Tn safety at the time. The plain-
tiff had the right to assume that the defendant's 
automobile, or any other vehicle coming westerly 
on Seventh street, would confine its travel to the 
righthand side of the street, as provided in the 
ordinance aforesaid, unless and until, in the rea-
sonably careful use of her faculties, she had 
reasonable cause to believe otherwise.'' 
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And in Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176 
P. 267, this court is on record against respondent's 
·' contention. The instruction there .approved was as fol~ 
... 
lows: 
'' 'You are further instructed that a street 
sweeper or a pedestrian who undertakes to use 
the street in· the line of his employment 'vhere 
it is frequently used by automobiles or other 
vehicles, has the right without looking and listen-
ing to presume that drivers of automobiles are 
observing the law, and they will so reduce or 
gauge their speed and are so conducting them-
selves so as to meet the obligations which cir-
cumstances demand of them at such places.' '' 
The court said : 
''The instruction, in effect, merely informed 
the jury that the plaintiff had a right to assun1e 
that the driver of the automobile 'vould exercise 
ordinary care in driving the car. This certainly 
is the law everywhere. No one using a public 
street or being lawfully thereon is required to 
assume otherwise than that all persons using the 
same will exercise ordinary care in doing so and 
will not expose any one on the street to unneces-
sary danger. ' ' 
At the oral argument it was suggested that the doc-
trine of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Com-
pany, 80 Utah 331, 15 P. ( 2d) 309, has overruled the 
Ferguson case and is a committal by this court against 
the general ruling set forth in the preceding cases. We 
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respectfully submit that this is not so. The Dalley case 
did involve the driving of an automobile into a truck 
illegally parked on the highway and the case held that 
it is negligence as a matter of law for a person to drive 
an automobile upon a traveled public highway used by 
vehicles and pedestrians at such a rate of speed that the 
said automobile can not be stopped within the distance 
at which the operator of the said car is able to see objects 
on the highway in front of him. To this extent, as ap-
plied to ~ivil negligence, it may be a limitation upon the 
general rule that one has a right to presume that others 
will obey the law. But the doctrine of "the assured 
distance ahead'' has taken a direction peculiar and dis-
tinct in itself. The Dalley case has gone farther than 
any of the Utah cases on the point, and later cases have 
limited its application rather than extended it. Both 
Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 98 Utah 253, 98 P. (2d) 
363, and Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P. (2) 
117, show that a driver need not at all times be on his 
guard against one illegally on the highway. We submit 
that whatever limitations the D,alley case places on the 
general rule, they should not be extended. 
It is significant that two of the states in the fore-
going opinions, Ohio and Washington, which approved 
the general rule in the cases heretofore cited had prior 
to rendering those decisions already approved the ''as-
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sured clear distance ahead" rule. Werner v. Rowley, 
129 Ohio St. 15, 193 N. E. 623; Ebling v. Nielson, 109 
-- Wash. 355, 186 P. 887. 
In Olson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Company, 98 Utah 
208, 98 P. (2d) 944, this court held that when a railroad 
company is using its right of way in a careful and lawful 
manner, it has a right to presume that motorists on 
crossing streets will proceed lawfully and carefully and 
will drive with their cars in such control as to be able 
to stop within the distance at which they can see objects 
ahead. 
Let us remember, too, that we are dealing in the 
case at bar with the definition of criminal negligence. 
We submit that the words of Mr. Justice Larson in his 
dissenting opinion in Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 
supra, are applicable in the case at bar: 
''But when one is unlawfully upon the high-
way, is making an unlawful use of the highway, he 
should not be permitted to impose upon another 
making a lawful use thereof the duty of protecting 
him in his unlawful use. To a wrongdoer the 
driver owes only the duty of not wilfully injuring 
him or his property. Since the wrongdoer is not 
lawfully upon the highway the driver is not 
charged with anticipating his presence there and 
is not impressed with the duty of protecting him 
to the same extent as he owes to one making 
lawful use of the highway.'' 
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The court committed error· in refusing to give re-
quested instruction No. 15 so that the jury could prop-
erly arrive at a definition of criminal negligence. 
Respondent also objects that requested Instruction 
No. 15 was too general in not informing the jury what 
unlawful conduct of the deceased would bring about such 
results, citing Blackford v. Kaplan, supra. In that case 
the instruction read: 
" 'Right of way' means the right of a vehicle 
to proceed. uninterruptedly in a lawful manner 
in the direction it is moving in preference to 
another vehicle approaching from a different 
direction into its path. You are therefore in-
structed that if you find that the defendant in 
approaching or entering the intersection 'vhere 
the collision in this case took place was not 
proceeding in a lawful manner, he therefore did 
not enjoy any preferential status or privilege over 
the driver of, the other car which the statutes 
of Ohio might have otherwise given him.'' 
The court said of that requested instruction: 
''This request is objectionable for the reason 
that it does not explain what acts would be un-
lawful and work a forfeiture of the preferential 
right; it should not be left to the jury to deter-
mine what was or was not lawful and in accord 
with the statutes. The explanation, however, 
might well be given ~in ~other instructions by the 
court; but the record does not show such an 
explanation was ·anywher-e made s~o as to clarify 
the request." (Italics ours.) 
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~ This instruction would have been good if other 
~: instructions had clarified what the unla,vful act was. 
In the case at bar, defendant's requested instructions 
Nos. 12, 13, 18, and 20 clearly set forth to the jury what 
&1 
I~ 
Kanon 's unlawful acts were. 
When respondent, in attempting to defend the re-
fusal to give defendant's requested instructions Nos. 
20 and 21 says that there was no evidence to justify 
these instructions because Kanon was as close to the 
righthand curb as was practicable, as long as there was 
a curb where he was riding, respondent does not face 
the fact that Kanon was riding straight out in the 
direction in which he had been riding and did not turn 
east to follow the pedestrian lane ( Tr. 89) . His course 
would immediately throw him into the center lane of 
traffic (Tr. 33). The officers' measure1nents also indi-
cate this clear course of the deceased (Exhibit "B "). 
To say that Kanon was not violating the ordinance be-
cause there was no curb in the intersection is specious. 
At the time of the collision he was already out in the 
road and headed straight on a line which 'vas rnore 
than 22 feet from the east curb of Second West street 
south of Ninth South. There was a clear violation of 
law. 
Respondent urges that in Instruction 7 A the court 
sufficiently instructed the jury as to the conduct of the 
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deceased. In that instruction the court told the jury 
to consider the conduct of the deceased, but in no way 
detailed any of that conduct or told the jury that the 
deceased's conduct was unlawful. The court refused 
to do this when it refused to give the instructions relat-
ing to the failure of Kanon to have a light on his bicycle 
and his not being on the extreme righthand edge of the 
road. This has nothing to do with the question of the 
deceased's contributory negligence that the respondent 
argues about at length on pages 31 et seq. The jury 
must be told that the conduct of the deceased was illegal 
before the jury can properly determine whether or not 
the defendant was negligent in failing to see Sylvester 
Kanon. It is possible that the whole question of guilt 
of the defendant because of failure to keep a lookout 
depended upon the jury's knowledge that Kanon's acts 
were unlawful. This is why it was so essential that 
these instructions be given. 
3. The Burden of Proof Was C·ast on the Defen-
dant by the Giving of Instruction No. 7A. (Par. 
(c) -of Respondent's Brief). 
Counsel submitted that appellant can not take ad-
vantage of the court's adding the last sentence in its 
Instruction No. 7 A, because exception was taken to the 
whole instruction and not to the last part only. Respon-
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,.., 
· ~ dent properly points out that the reason for requiring 
!D.~ exceptions to parts of an instruction when any of the 
~ ~ 
instruction ~s good, is to point out specifically to the 
~ ~-
court the error it makes in any part of the instruction. 
·- We submit that the manner of taking this exception 
to Instruction No. 7 A brings it within the reason and 
the rule. In defendant's requested instruction No. 9 
~-~ · defendant requested what became the first sentence of 
Instruction No. 7 A. The court on its own volition added 
-.: the second sentence. Clearly the court could not presume, 
~.: when defendant excepted to Instruction No. 7 A, that he 
-- was excepting to that part of the charge he had already 
~? requested. The exception therefore 'vent to the second 
part. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the state did not prove any violation 
of the law by the defendant and that on the 1neager 
proof adduced the case should have been disn1issed. 
In State v. Chealey, ______ Utah ______ , 116 P. (2d) 377, this 
court said, referring to that defendant: 
"Aside from the naked facts that the d~fen­
dant drove his auto-truck off the right hand side 
of the highway- the side upon which he 'vas 
lawfully driving, there is no evidence as to care-
lessness or heedlessness ; - none as to doing so 
in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
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others. Turning off on the right hand side of the 
road might have been the result of a temporary 
diversion of attention to which all persons are at 
times subject, or falling asleep, or the approach 
of another car in the defendant's lane of the high-
way as maintained by him. The point is that the 
state made no attempt to explain any reason of 
circumstance or condition or cause other than the 
turning of the auto-truck off the high,vay. No 
attempt was made by the state to sho'v that any 
person upon the highway was endangered. Ex-
planations by reasoning back from results with 
no place to land are not helpful. They lead to 
speculations only.'' 
In the principal case likewise there is nothing to 
show that carelessness and heedlessness in wilful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of others which must 
be found to sustain this conviction of manslaughter. 
The State's whole case rests upon the fact that there 
was a collision. We submit that none of the other evi-
dence upon which respondent's brief tries to weave a 
case in any way shows recklessness on the part of the 
defendant. 
Even if there had been evidence from which the 
jury might have found recklessness, the court deprived 
the defendant of the right to have the jury ascertain 
the facts. It kept from them the fact that the deceased's 
conduct was unlawful. Finally, it presented to the jury 
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~· as a possible basis of conviction an alleged failure on 
~ the defendant's part to yield the right of way when the 
~· 
· right of way was non-existent. 
~ 
~. 
~ Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE, RICHARDS AND .. 
McKAY, 
Attorneys for D.efendant 
and Appellant. 
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